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Abstract
A central dispute in understanding Frege’s philosophy concerns how the sense of a
complex expression relates to the senses of its component expressions. According
to one reading, the sense of a complex expression is a whole built from the senses
of the component expressions. On this interpretation, Frege is an early proponent
of structured propositions. A rival reading says that senses compose by functional
application: the sense of a complex expression is the value of the function denoted by
its functional component for the arguments denoted by its remaining components. I
argue that two non-negotiable Fregean theses entail that senses compose by functional
application. One thesis is that referents compose by functional application. The other
thesis is that an expression in an indirect context refers to its customary sense.
Two aspects of Frege’s mature semantic theory have each been heralded as central ad-
vances in the development of a rigorous semantics. One aspect—introduced in Function
and Concept—is that reference is not merely compositional, but functionally compositional.
According to Frege, each expression has a Bedeutung, or referent. Some expressions refer
to functions. Others expressions refer to arguments for these functions. A complex ex-
pression refers to the value of the function referred to by one component for the arguments
referred to by the remaining components. Letting ~.R take an expression to its referent,
Frege’s model can be stated as follows.1
*This paper improved significantly as a result of advice and feedback from Fiona Doherty, Philip Ebert,
Bjørn Jesperen, Lorraine Juliano Keller, Casey McCoy, Joey Pollack, Brian Rabern, Alex Radelescu, Stephen
Read, David Rey, Wolfgang Schwarz, Alex Yates, and two referees for Synthese. Additional thanks are due to
Kevin Klement. The paper has also benefited from feedback by audiences at the University of Edinburgh, the
University of Glasgow, and the University of Uppsala.
1The operation ~.R will be type-sorted since the referent of an incomplete expression is of a different type
from the referent of a complete expression. This point is emphasized in (Wright 2004).
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functional composition of reference: If α is a complex expression composed of
a functional expression β applied to n argument expressions γ1 . . . γn, then ~αR =
~βR(~γ1R, . . . , ~γnR).
In addition to its core role in Frege’s later philosophy, this model of semantic composition
has been extraordinarily fruitful as a “leading idea” in contemporary formal semantic
theories (Heim and Kratzer 1998, p. 13).2
In the same work, Frege observes that reference does not explain all of the relevant
properties of an expression.3 Two terms such as ‘the capital of Texas’ and ‘Austin’ refer
to the same city. Yet, one can understand both expressions without knowing that they
co-refer. To explain this cognitive difference, Frege posits that expressions have senses in
addition to referents. The sense of an expression is grasped by everyone who understands
it. Although the expressions ‘the capital of Texas’ and ‘Austin’ co-refer, they differ in sense.
In On Sense and Reference, Frege appeals to the distinction between sense and reference
to explain why certain co-referential expressions do not substitute in all contexts without
change of truth-value. Although ‘Austin’ and ‘the capital of Texas’ co-refer, the attitude
ascriptions (1) and (2) differ in truth-value.
(1) Ben believes that Austin is hot.
(2) Ben believes that the capital of Texas is hot.
2The expression functional compositionality comes from (Cresswell 2002). In this use, functional composition-
ality is a more specific thesis than compositionality, which says that the meaning of a complex is uniquely
determined by the meaning of its parts and their arrangement. Functional compositionality demands that the
meaning of the complex expression is determined by a specific semantic composition rule, functional applica-
tion. Cresswell’s use of the expression ‘functional compositionality’ differs subtly from another standard use
of the expression (Pagin and Westerståhl 2010a: 254), on which the semantic value of a complex expression
is the result of an application of a function (determined by the syntactic composition rule) to the semantic
values of the constituent expressions.
3(Frege 1891/1997, p. 138).
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Frege’s explanation is that the referent of an expression in an opaque context shifts to its
customary sense.
reference shift semantics: In a singly embedded opaque context such as a propo-
sitional attitude ascription, the referent of an expression α is its ordinary sense.
By appeal to the reference shift semantics, Frege preserves his insight that the referent of
a complex expression is a function of the referents of its parts.
The functional composition of reference and the reference shift semantics are
uncontroversially Fregean theses. I argue that they together entail the controversial thesis
that senses functionally compose, just as referents do. That is, the sense of a complex
expression is the result of functionally applying the sense expressed by its functional
component to the senses of its argument components. Letting ~.S map an expression to
its sense, the thesis can be expressed as follows:
functional composition of sense: If α is a complex expression composed of a
functional expression β applied to n argument expressions γ1 . . . γn, then ~αS =
~βS(~γ1S, . . . , ~γnS).
The functional composition of sense entails that the sense of a predicate is a sense function,
a function that maps senses of terms to the senses of sentences. Although historically
popular,4 this view has recently been criticized in favor of the rival view that the sense of a
complex expression is a structured complex containing the senses of its components.5 If the
sense of a complex expression is a structured whole, the components of which correspond
to the components of the sentence, then two sentences differing structurally cannot express
the same thought. But, if the sense of a sentence is the value of the function denoted by
4See (Church 1951) and (Geach 1976). See (Klement 2002, 66, footnote 9) for a more comprehensive list.
5Sources of this criticism include (Dummett 1981a, chapter 6), (Sullivan 1992), (Klement 2002), and (Heck
and May 2011).
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its functional component for the arguments denoted by the remaining components, then
structurally different sentences may express the same thought.
The choice between these interpretations of the composition of sense is of central
importance for understanding Frege’s core aim, logicism—the thesis that mathematics
reduces to logic. Frege defends logicism by regimenting ordinary mathematical claims
into the language of Begriffsschrift and showing that the regimented sentences follow from
purely logical principles. Proponents of the two interpretations often differ as to whether
two ordinary sentences with different structures or a sentence and its regimentation into
Begriffsschrift express the same thought.6 This makes a difference to whether Frege’s
regimentations replace or interpret ordinary mathematical sentences. More centrally,
Frege also defends some of the axioms of Begriffsschrift by suggesting that distinct sentences
of this formal language express the same thought.7 Proponents of structured conceptions
of sense such as Klement (2002, p. 87) and Heck and May (2011, p. 155) see this as a
mistake or “slip” on Frege’s part.8
The rival interpretations echo in contemporary debates about propositions, the con-
temporary analogues of Frege’s thoughts. According to some contemporary theories,
propositions lack a part-whole structure.9 On such views, the meanings of the parts of a
sentence may determine the proposition expressed by the sentence, but they are not con-
stituents of this proposition. So sentences with different structures can express the same
proposition. Structured propositionalists say that a proposition is a structured whole.
6For the former issue, see (Dummett 1981a, pp. 228-9). For the latter issue, Weiner (1999, pp. 67-8) and
Makin (2000, chapter 7) hold that the regimentations replace ordinary mathematical sentences. (Blanchette
2012) argues that the natural language sentences and their Begriffsschrift regimentation express the same
thought.
7See (Frege 1891/1997, 136).
8A major source of this objection is (Dummett 1991, chapter 14).
9Propositions may be identified with intensions, functions from possibilities to truth-values, or with more
fine-grained entities. See Cresswell (2002) for intensionalism and Keller (2013, 2019) and Merricks (2015) for
more-fine grained views.
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Many say that its parts are identical to the semantic values of the components of the
sentence that expresses it. They thereby deny functional compositionality.10 According
to such views, sentences with different structures never express the same proposition.11
The functional composition of reference and the reference shift semantics have been
deeply instrumental in the development of formal semantics. Respecting these principles
or their descendants in contemporary semantics imposes constraints on any conception of
propositions on offer.12
1 The Functional composition of Reference
Starting with Function and Concept, the functional composition of reference takes a cen-
tral place in Frege’s philosophy. Frege arrives at this conception of semantic composition
by generalizing from the case of complex terms in mathematical languages. In this sec-
tion, I explain his analysis of these expressions and then discuss the principles by which
he generalizes this analysis to other expressions.
1.1 The Mathematical Model
Frege’s core model for complex expressions comes from mathematics.13 According to the
Fregean analysis, a complex expression of mathematics such as ‘7−1’ is partly composed of
“complete” expressions such as ‘7’ and ‘1’. The expression ‘7−1’ also leaves an incomplete
remainder when its complete components are removed, which Frege writes as ‘ξ−ζ’. Frege
says that this incomplete expression refers to a function that is similarly incomplete. The
10See Salmon (1986), Soames (1987), and King (1995, 2007).
11See (King 2013). (Båve 2019) offers similar considerations to criticize act-based accounts of propositional
attitudes developed in Moltmann (2003), Soames (2010), and Hanks (2011).
12For views of structured propositions that do attempt to respect the developments of functional composi-
tionality, see Elbourne (2011) and Pickel (2019, forthcoming).
13See (Frege 1891/1997, p. 131). See also the letter to Russell dated 20.10.1902 (p. 149) in (Frege 1980).
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function term needs an argument to form a complete expression. The function itself needs
an argument to return a complete entity.
[O]ne can always speak of the name of a function as having empty places,
since what fills them does not, strictly speaking, belong to them. Accordingly I
call the function unsaturated, or in need of supplementation, because its name
has first to be completed with the sign of an argument if we are to obtain a
[referent] that is complete in itself. I call such a [referent] an object and, in this
case, the value of the function for the argument that effects the supplementing
or saturating. (Frege 1892/1972, p. 118)
The last sentence expresses the functional composition of reference for expressions
which result from saturating a functional expression with expressions referring to ar-
guments of the right type. Frege next generalizes this picture from the expressions of
mathematical language to all expressions of a well-constructed language.
1.2 Extending the Model
Frege (1891/1997, p. 137) observes that the notion of a function has been extended in
two directions. One extension expands the range of expressions that contain functional
expressions. Frege (1891/1997, pp. 139-40) argues that expressions such as ‘the capital
of England’, ‘the capital of the German Empire’, and ‘the capital of Texas’ take the same
syntactic positions as proper names. These expressions can also be split up into parts. One
part of each—‘England’, ‘the German Empire’, and ‘Texas’, respectively—is saturated. The
remainder (‘the capital of . . . ’) is unsaturated; it has a gap. Entering a complete name
into the expression ‘the capital of . . . ’ outputs a complex term: a name for London, for
Berlin, and for Austin, respectively. Saturating ‘the capital of . . . ’ with co-referential
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names such as ‘Texas’ and ‘the Lone Star State’ always results in co-referential names.
Based on this correspondence with mathematical expressions, Frege says the incomplete
expression ‘the capital of . . . ’ refers to a function. Saturating this incomplete expression
with a complete expression refers to the value of the function when it takes the referent
of the complete expression as argument. The overall argument is not that Frege regards
these natural language expressions as functional expressions but rather that the Begriffsschrift
regimentations of these natural language expressions are functional expressions.
The other extension expands the concept of a function. A function takes any objects as
arguments and output any objects as values. The question now arises whether Frege can
delimit the range of possible objects and functions. Frege answers that each thing is either
an object or a function.
When we have thus admitted objects without restriction as arguments and
values of functions, the question arises what it is that we are here calling an
object. [. . . ] an object is anything that is not a function, so that an expression
for it does not contain any empty place. (Frege 1891/1997, p. 140)
Complete expressions refer to objects. Frege is clearly committed to the thesis that the
expression for a function must be incomplete. But I believe that he is likewise committed
to the converse as well: an incomplete expression always refers to a function. As Frege
says, “We recognize the function in the expression by imagining the latter as split up”
(Frege 1891/1997, p. 134, cf. Frege 1879/1970, p. 13). This commitment explains why
Frege immediately concludes that the incomplete component ‘the capital of . . . ’ expresses
a function from the fact that (the Begriffsschrift regimentation of) ‘the capital of the German
Empire’ can be divided into a complete and an incomplete component.
Indeed, Frege moves further. Since sentences lack gaps, they are complete expressions.
Sentences therefore refer to objects and not to functions.
7
A statement contains no empty place, and therefore we must take its Bedeutung
as an object. (Frege 1891/1997, p. 140)
A sentence such as ‘Caesar conquered Gaul’ contains complete components: ‘Caesar’ and
‘Gaul’. Just as the result of removing a complete expression from a complex term yields
an expression with a gap, the result of removing a complete expression from a sentence
yields an expression with a gap, ‘ξ conquered Gaul’. Therefore, the result of removing a
name from a sentence denotes a function. This argument presupposes that if a complete
expression can be divided into a complete component and an incomplete component,
then the remainder refers to a function. Predicates such as ‘. . . conquered Gaul’ refer to
functions, which Frege calls concepts. These functions take as input the objects referred to
by complete expressions and output the objects referred to by sentences.14
2 Sense and Indirect Reference
Sentences that differ by the substitution of co-referential constituents always agree in
reference. But they may “tell us quite different things, express quite different thoughts”
(Frege 1891/1997, p. 138). A thought is the sense of the sentence that expresses it.15
Individual words also have senses. The thought expressed by a sentence is determined
by the senses of the words that make it up.
[A] proposition [that is, sentence] consists of parts which must somehow con-
tribute to the expression of the sense of the proposition, so they themselves
must have a sense. (Frege to Jourdain, undated, Frege 1980, p. 79)
14Frege equates the “predicative nature” of the referent of a predicate with the incompleteness or “unsatu-
ratedness” of a function (Frege 1892/1972, p. 119).
15I believe that Frege’s early formulation of the reason for positing sense in terms of what the sentences “tell
us” strongly supports the views of (Noonan 2001, p. 187) and (Makin 2010, pp. 153-4)—as against (Dummett
1981a, p. 293) and (Geach 1961, p. 162)—that the theory of indirect reference is not merely some “optional
extra which can be grafted on to the distinction of sense and reference” (Noonan 2001, p. 187).
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Frege posits senses because substituting co-referential terms in a sentence does not always
preserve the thought expressed. The sentences ‘Austin is hot’ and ‘the capital of Texas is
hot’ express different thoughts, even though ‘Austin’ and ‘the capital of Texas’ co-refer.16
2.1 Indirect Reference
A belief ascription contains an embedded sentence and ascribes the thought the embedded
sentence is customarily used to express. Thus, (1) ascribes to Ben the thought that Austin
is hot and (3) ascribes to him the thought that Seattle is rainy.
(1) Ben believes that Austin is hot.
(3) Ben believes that Seattle is rainy.
Although the embedded sentences—‘Austin is hot’ and ‘Seattle is rainy’—are both true,
(1) and (3) may differ in truth-value. Frege concludes from such cases that the referent of
a sentence in a belief ascription is not its truth-value, but rather the thought it expresses,
its customary sense.
Sentences are not the only expressions that acquire a different referent in an attitude
ascription. Component expressions also refer to their customary senses in attitude ascrip-
tions.
In reported speech one talks about the sense, e.g., of another person’s remarks.
It is quite clear that in this way of speaking words do not have their cus-
tomary reference but designate what is usually their sense. [. . . ] In reported
speech, words are used indirectly or have their indirect reference. We distin-
guish accordingly the customary from the indirect reference of a word; and its
16See (Frege 1892/1970, p. 62) and (Frege to Russell 13.11.1904, Frege 1980, p. 164). This marks a change
from Frege’s earlier position according to which a sentence has a judgeable content as its single semantic value.
See discussion in (Currie 1984) and (Weiner 1999, pp. 38-40; pp. 78-9).
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customary sense from its indirect sense. The indirect reference of a word is
accordingly its customary sense. (Frege 1892/1970, p. 59)
This requires making explicit an assumption that Frege often leaves implicit. A sentence
has the same syntactic structure inside and outside of an attitude ascription.17
embedded structure: A sentence has the same syntactic and semantic structure both
inside and outside of an attitude ascription. This principle can be broken into two
sub-theses:
If a sentence φ results from the application of a functional expression π to
argument expressions α1,. . . αn outside of an attitude ascription, then it has this
same syntactic derivation inside of an attitude ascription and vice-versa.
All expressions that have referents outside of an attitude ascription have refer-
ents inside of an attitude ascription.
embedded structure says that a sentence inside an attitude ascription isn’t a syntactic atom.
It has components. It isn’t a semantic atom either. Its components have some reference or
other. But embedded structure does not tell us what those referents are.
The reference shift semantics does tell us what the referent of an expression in an
attitude ascription is: its customary sense. Because expressions that are customarily co-
referential do not substitute salva veritate when embedded in attitude ascriptions, these
expressions cannot have their customary referents when embedded in these ascriptions.
For example, (1) may be true while (2) is false even though ‘Austin’ and ‘the capital of
Texas’ co-refer in direct contexts.
17This assumption is deeply reflected in Frege’s practice. For instance, in a letter to Russell (28.12.1902,
Frege 1980, p. 153), Frege typographically differentiates expressions embedded under a single attitude
operator from those that are twice embedded. This would be unnecessary if the embedded sentence had no
internal structure. And it would be mysterious if the embedded sentence had a different structure from an
unembedded occurrence of the same sentence.
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(1) Ben believes that Austin is hot.
(2) Ben believes that the capital of Texas is hot.
Frege concludes that the terms ‘Austin’ and ‘the capital of Texas’ do not refer to their
customary referents in (1) and (2), respectively. Rather, these expressions refer to their
customary senses. The customary senses of ‘Austin’ and ‘the capital of Texas’ differ.
Therefore, they also differ in reference when embedded in belief ascriptions, allowing for
the possibility that (1) and (2) may differ in truth-value.
2.2 Regimenting Indirect Reference
The reference shift semantics introduces complications to the representation of the se-
mantic theory. A single expression has different referents (and potentially different senses)
in different contexts. To handle this, one might relativize the reference function ~.R to a
context so that ~.CR represents the customary referent of an expression and ~.
I
R represents
the indirect referent. The referent of a whole would be determined by the referents of
its parts in their respective contexts. This approach has been called the method of indirect
discourse (Kaplan 1964: pp. 22-23). It has been developed to a considerable degree of
technical sophistication. It has even been argued that it paves the way to an “occurrence
based” alternative to the standard “expression based” semantics.18
Frege nowhere articulates anything this sophisticated. Geach (1961, p. 162) even
suggests that “Frege never worked out this theory far enough to have to consider how
it should be symbolically expressed.” Yet, in a letter to Russell, Frege does develop his
approach, which has subsequently called been the method of direct discourse (Kaplan 1964:
pp. 22-23). Frege treats the fact that a word has different referents in different contexts as a
kind of ambiguity. One expression occurs unembedded and a different expression occurs
18See (Pagin and Westerståhl 2010b) and (Pickel and Rabern forthcoming).
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embedded. In representing this formally, one expression is used in ordinary discourse
and a different expression is used embedded.
To avoid ambiguity, we ought really to have special signs in indirect speech,
though their connection with the corresponding signs in direct speech should
be easy to recognize. (Frege to Russell 28.12.1902, Frege 1980, p. 153)
Frege singly underlines expressions when they are used to refer to their customary senses
and doubly underlines expressions when they are used to refer to their indirect senses.19
For my purposes, there is no difference between the two approaches. I follow Frege in
deploying the method of direct discourse. In regimenting an attitude ascription such as (1)
‘Ben believes that Austin is hot’, I underline the expressions occurring in the ‘that’-clause.
(1a) Ben believes that Austin is hot.
An underlined expression refers to the customary sense of the expression: ~AustinS =
~AustinR.20 By Embedded Structure, every expression occurring in the derivation of a
sentence has an underlined correlate occurring in the derivation of the underlined correlate
of the sentence.
3 The Composition of Sense
The sense of a whole sentence such as ‘Austin is hot’ is somehow determined by the
senses of its components, ‘Austin’ and ‘ξ is hot’, and their organization. This raises two
19The translation in (Frege 1980) uses italics for singly embedded contexts and capitalized expressions for
doubly embedded. Either approach makes the relation between the expression referring to the customary
referent and the expression referring to the customary sense is “easy to recognize”. Kripke (2011a, p. 263)
rightly questions what it means to say that the correspondence should be “easy to recognize”.
20This provision handles unembedded attitude ascriptions. Cases of embedded attitude ascriptions are
contentious.
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questions. First, how do the senses of the parts go together to determine the sense of the
whole? Second, what is the sense of the function term? I argue that senses functionally
compose just as referents do. The sense of a functional expression is a sense function, a
function from senses to senses. The sense of a composite expression is the value of the
sense of its functional component for the senses of its saturated components as arguments.
Thus, just as the referent of ‘the capital of Texas’ is the value of the referent of ‘the capital
of ξ’ when applied to the referent of ‘Texas’, the sense of ‘the capital of Texas’ will be the
value of the sense of ‘the capital of ξ’ when applied to the sense of ‘Texas’.
Historically, this interpretation was defended by pointing to the fact that Frege re-
peatedly writes that the sense of a functional expression such as a predicate or a logical
operator is unsaturated.21 For instance, Frege says that the sense of a negated sentence
such as ‘Texas is not hot’ results from somehow combining the unsaturated sense of ‘not’
with the saturated sense of the negated sentence ‘Texas is hot’.
The thought does not, by its make-up, stand in need of any completion; it
is self-sufficient. Negation on the other hand needs to be completed by the
thought. (Frege 1918-9/1984a, p. 386)
Frege refers to this unsaturated or incomplete sense of ‘not’ using an unsaturated expres-
sion: ‘the negation of. . . ’. The thought that Texas is not hot is the negation of the thought
that Texas is hot.
The fact that the sense of a functional expression is unsaturated suggests that this sense
is itself a function for two reasons. First, functions are Frege’s core model of unsaturated
entities. Frege does not provide any alternative model of unsaturated entities.22 Second,
as we have seen, Frege believes that the division between objects and functions is total.
21Emphasized by (Geach 1976).
22This is a crucial point of (Geach 1976, p. 445).
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An argument is anything that is not a function, so that an expression for it does
not contain any empty place. (Frege 1891/1997, p. 140)
Since the senses of functional expressions are unsaturated, they cannot be objects. So, they
must be functions. Any rival interpretation must provide some alternative model for the
incompleteness of senses.
This argument is suggestive, but not conclusive. Opponents of the functional com-
position of sense have suggested that the senses and referents of incomplete expressions
are unsaturated in different ways. So, even if they are—in some sense—unsaturated, the
senses of incomplete expressions might nevertheless be objects.
To move beyond the impasse, I will argue that the reference shift semantics provides
a direct route from the functional composition of reference to the functional compo-
sition of sense. This argument tells decisively in favor of the functional composition of
sense, because it does not rely on the premise that there must be an analogy between senses
and reference, but rather directly connects them by way of the reference shift semantics.
4 The Simple Argument
I turn now to the argument for the functional composition of sense. For concreteness,
consider the sentence ‘Austin is hot’ composed by saturating the functional expression ‘ξ
is hot’ with the complete expression ‘Austin’. In this case, the functional composition of
sense says that the sense of this sentence is the result of applying the sense expressed by ‘ξ
is hot’ to the sense expressed by ‘Austin’. That is, ~Austin is hotS = ~ξ is hotS(~AustinS).
This can be shown by considering (1).
(1) Ben believes that Austin is hot.
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According to the reference shift semantics, the expressions in the sentence ‘Austin is hot’
refer to their customary senses in the context of (1). This is implemented in the semantics
by regimenting the attitude ascription so that every embedded expression is replaced by
an expression referring to a sense.
(1a) Ben believes that Austin is hot.
The sentence ‘Austin is hot’ refers to the sense of the original sentence ‘Austin is hot’. That
is, ~Austin is hotR = ~Austin is hotS. embedded structure guarantees that the structure
of the resulting embedded sentence mirrors the structure of the original: ‘Austin is hot’
syntactically derives from ‘Austin’ and ‘ξ is hot’. The reference shift semantics tells us
that the referents of these expressions are the senses of their unembedded counterparts:
~AustinR = ~AustinS and ~ξ is hotR = ~ξ is hotS.
Combined with the functional composition of reference, these results immediately
entail the functional composition of sense. The functional composition of reference
demands that ~Austin is hotR = ~ξ is hotR(~AustinR). Substituting identicals on both
sides results in the desired conclusion: ~Austin is hotS = ~ξ is hotS(~AustinS).
Generalizing this argument, embedded structure says that a sentence is embedded in
an attitude ascription retains its syntactic structure. So if the sentence φ is derived from
the application of a functional expression π to n argument expressions, α1,. . . , αn, then
its embedded correlate φ is derived by applying a correlated functional expression π to n
correlated argument expressions α1,. . . ,αn. The reference shift semantics says that the
referents ofφ, π, and α1,. . . ,αn are the senses ofφ, π and α1,. . . ,αn, respectively. Finally, the
functional composition of reference says that the referent of φ is the result of applying
the referent of π to the referents of α1,. . . ,αn. It follows immediately by the substitution of
identicals that the sense of φ is the result of applying the sense of π to the senses of α1,. . . ,
αn.
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This argument reinforces the traditional argument for the functional composition
of sense from the fact that the senses of functional expressions are unsaturated. When
Frege describes how the thought expressed by a negated sentence is “made up” from its
component parts—negation and the negated thought—he introduces a device for referring
to each component. He refers to the sense of the word ‘not’ using the incomplete expression
‘the negation of . . . ’.
To bring out in language the need for completion, we may write ‘the negation
of . . . ’ where a blank is left after ‘of’ indicates where the completed expression
is to be inserted. For the relation of completing, in the realm of thoughts and
their parts, has something similar to it in the realm of sentences and their parts.
(Frege 1918-9/1984a, p. 386)
The negated thought is referred to using the construction ‘the thought . . . ’. Frege describes
the construction of a thought as follows.
The thought
(21/20)100 is not equal to
10√
1021
is the negation of the thought:
(21/20)100 is equal to
10√
1021 (Frege 1918-9/1984a, 386).




(4) the negation of the thought that (21/20)100 is equal to
10√
1021
A complex term such as (4) should be analyzed like any other complex term. The referent
of (4) is the result of applying the referent of ‘the negation of. . . ’ to the referent of ‘the
16
thought that (21/20)100 is equal to
10√
1021’. But this implies that the sense of ‘(21/20)100 is
not equal to
10√




5 Responses to the Simple Argument
The functional composition of reference and the reference shift semantics straight-
forwardly entail the functional composition of sense. Yet influential works on Frege
disavow the conclusion. Few address this argument in detail. But the issue does bubble
up to the surface periodically. I now consider Dummett’s (1981a) rejection of the refer-
ence shift semantics and Klement’s (2002) rejection of the functional composition of
reference.
5.1 Rejecting the reference shift
Dummett believes that the sense of a sentence is a structured complex composed of the
senses of its components. He rejects the identification of the sense of a function term with
a sense function. Yet, Dummett squarely faces the argument I developed above, focussing
on the sentence ‘Plato believes that Socrates was wise’.
The whole clause, ‘Socrates was wise’ stands . . . for the thought which it ex-
presses, and therefore functions as a complex proper name. A complex proper
name cannot be composed merely out of other proper names—expressions
standing for objects: it must contain functional expressions also. So it appears
that, in this sentence, ‘ξ is wise’ cannot stand for an object, but must stand for
the function whose value for the sense of ‘Socrates’ as argument is the thought
that Socrates was wise . . . Since we said that in an opaque context ‘ξwas wise’
17
stands for its sense, it will follow that the sense of ‘ξwas wise’ is this function.
(Dummett 1981a, p. 292)
To respond to the argument, Dummett proposes a change to Frege’s view.
. . . Frege’s doctrine of indirect reference requires one further emendation. The
sense of a predicate is indeed to be considered as an object—the referent of the
expression ‘the sense of the predicate’; but its referent in opaque contexts is
not this sense, but the associated function, which maps the sense of a name on
to the thought expressed by the sentence formed by attaching the predicate to
that name. The referent of an incomplete expression, whether direct or indirect,
must always be incomplete. (Dummett 1981a, p. 294)
According to Dummett, the referent of a simple proper name such as ‘Texas’ in an indirect
context is its customary sense. However, the incomplete expression ‘the capital of . . . ’ in
indirect contexts does not refer to its customary sense, but rather to a function which maps
the sense of ‘Texas’ to the sense of ‘the capital of Texas’. Sense functions play a role in the
semantics of opaque contexts, but they are not the senses of incomplete expressions.
Observe first that Dummett proposes an emendation of Frege and not an interpretation.
Dummett simply concedes that the functional composition of sense follows from Frege’s
own explicit views. But we also saw that Frege refers to the senses of incomplete expres-
sions using incomplete expressions even in direct discourse. If the functional expression
‘the negation of . . . ’ refers to the sense of the incomplete expression ‘it is not the case
that . . . ’, then the same argument would apply in direct discourse. Dummett cannot
plausibly extend his emendation of Frege to these contexts because, in the context that
Frege is writing, he is illustrating how the sense of a composite is made up of the senses
of its components. It is not plausible for Dummett to reject this passage without also
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rejecting a considerable portion of the evidence that the senses of composite expressions
are composed of the senses of the constituent expressions.
5.2 Rejecting the functional composition of reference
In Frege and the Logic of Sense and Reference, Klement defends an alternative picture of
structured senses. For Klement, the senses of incomplete expressions constitute a new
category of unsaturated entity:23
[Senses] are neither functions nor objects, but a particular type of unsaturated
entity in the realm of [sense]. (Klement 2002, p. 74)
The sense of an incomplete expression such as ‘ξ is hot’ is incomplete, but it is not a
function. It composes with the sense of a saturated expression such as the sense of
‘Austin’ to yield a thought, the thought that Austin is hot.
Klement says that the sense of a composite expression is the result of some operation
suitably like functional application applied to the senses of its component expressions.
I will indicate this operation using corner brackets ‘. . . 〈. . .〉’. In the simple case, sense
composition works as follows:
sense composition: If α is an n-adic functional expression and β1, . . . , βn are n ex-
pressions of the right type, then ~α(β1, . . . , βn)S = ~αS〈~β1S, . . . , ~βnS〉.
While the reference of a whole is the result of functionally applying the function referred
to by its functional component to the arguments referred to by the remaining components,
sense composition proceeds by applying an operation parallel to—but distinct from—
functional application to senses of these sentential components.
23Klement leaves ‘Sinn’, ‘Bedeutung’, and ‘Gedanke’ (and their correlates) untranslated in his writing. In
quotation from him, I will replace these with ‘sense’, ‘reference’, and ‘thought’, respectively, to clarify how
Klement’s view is connected to my own discussion.
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But the reference shift semantics ties sense composition to reference composition.
Indeed, Klement cites as an advantage of his proposal that—unlike Dummett—he may
preserve the reference shift semantics.
This complication is avoided on my view, since I can take the indirect [referents]
of function expressions to be the incomplete entities they normally express as
[senses], and it is entirely natural how such expressions would come together
with other expressions to form expressions for full [thoughts]. (Klement 2002,
p. 75)
Consider a specific case: the sentence ‘Austin is hot’ embedded in (1a). According to
Klement, the component expressions ‘Austin’ and ‘ξ is hot’ refer to the customary senses
of ‘Austin’ and ‘ξ is hot’, respectively. The referent of the composite expression ‘Austin
is hot’ is not the result of functionally applying the referent of the functional expression
to the referents of its components. Rather, the referent of this expression is the result
of applying the operation . . . 〈. . .〉 to the senses of ‘ξ is hot’ and ‘Austin’. In symbols:
~Austin is hotR = ~ξ is hotR〈~AustinR〉, ~ξ is hotR(~AustinR). So Klement’s proposal
demands rejecting the functional composition of reference. Indeed, Klement develops
an interesting system containing expressions specifically typed to refer to senses which
do not functionally compose. However, in my view, the functional composition of
reference is a non-negotiable component of Frege’s view after Function and Concept.
Klement himself observes that his proposal conflicts with another claim of Frege’s: ev-
erything is either an object or function. The senses of incomplete expressions, in particular,
are neither objects nor functions.
Perhaps the biggest drawback to this view is that it forces us to revise Frege’s
explicit claims that everything is either a function or an object. However, it is
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worth noting that at the spots in which Frege explicitly makes this claim . . . ,
he is speaking of the language of the Begriffsschrift. (Klement 2002, p. 74)
For Klement, Frege’s explicit claim that everything is either an object or a function should
be interpreted as applying only to expressions already named in the language of the
Begriffsschrift. Moreover, since the senses of incomplete expressions are still incomplete
in some sense, the expressions standing for them must be incomplete as well. These
expressions standing for incomplete senses would be written with argument places just
are normal function expressions.
Incomplete [senses] are similar to functions in being somehow unsaturated
and, thus, if signs were introduced standing for them in the Begriffsschrift,
they too would have to be written with argument-places such that when the
argument-place is filled, the whole stands for an object. (Klement 2002, p. 75)
Klement concludes that it was natural for Frege to overlook the senses of incomplete
expressions when making his explicit claim.
However, I disagree about the role of Frege’s claim that everything is either an object
or function. As I read the passage, Frege uses the explicit claim to decide how expressions
of natural language should be regimented into Begriffsschrift. Consider again the relevant
passage from Function and Concept. Immediately prior to claiming that everything is either
an object or function, Frege argued that the functional composition of reference should
generalize from mathematical expressions such as ‘7+5’ to the Begriffsschrift regimenta-
tions of natural language descriptions such as ‘the capital of the German Empire’ (Frege
1891/1997, p. 147). The referent of ‘the capital of the German Empire’ is the result of
applying the function referred to by ‘the capital of ξ’ to the argument referred to by ‘the
German Empire’. Frege then asks how far this generalization of the notions of object and
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function extends. As we have seen, his answer is that an object is anything that can be the
referent of a complete expression. Frege immediately concludes that since a statement—a
sentence—lacks empty places, it refers to an object. This argument would not work if
Frege implicitly restricts his criterion to expressions already in Begriffsschrift rather than
using it to decide how to regiment new expressions into Begriffsschrift. If Klement is right
to deny that the referent of a sentence in an attitude ascription is the value of the function
referred to by one component for the argument referred to by the other component, then
Frege’s argument that complex referring expressions and sentences of natural language
should be treated similarly is threatened. So Klement’s proposal rejects not only the letter
of Frege’s explicit claim, but undermines the arguments which rely on the spirit of the
claim.24
6 Against Structured Senses
Proponents of the functional composition of sense as an interpretation of Frege must
address Frege’s repeated use of part-whole language to describe the relationship between
the sense of a composite expression and the senses of its components. For instance, Frege
says that many thoughts are composed of an incomplete component and other complete
components.
24I have suppressed some complexity in Klement’s view. According to Klement (2002, pp. 127-8), ‘Austin is
hot’ has two relevant syntactic derivations when it is embedded in an attitude ascription. It can be arrived at
by applying the expression ‘ξ is hot’ to the name ‘Austin’. Semantically, Klement agrees with Dummett that
‘ξ is hot’ denotes a sense function and not its own customary sense. In doing so, I take him to reject the letter
of the reference shift semantics. However, ‘Austin is hot’ can also be derived from applying the functional
expression ‘δ is hot’ to the name ‘Austin’. Here ‘δ’ is a mark of incompleteness allowing only terms denoting
the senses of saturated names. The referent of ‘Austin is hot’ is not computed by functionally applying
the referent ‘δ is hot’ to the referent of ‘Austin’, but by determining a structured whole composed of these
referents. Since Klement (2002, p. 128) is explicit that ‘δ is hot’ is an“unsaturated” expression, he must reject
the letter of the functional composition of reference. Finally, since ‘Austin is hot’ unembedded cannot
be syntactically derived from applying the functional expression ‘δ is hot’ to the name ‘Austin’, Klement
abandons embedded structure. A sentence has a syntactic derivation when embedded under an attitude
ascription that it lacks outside of the attitude ascription. (Klement 2010) discusses these issues extensively.
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[A] thought is made up out of parts that are not themselves thoughts. The
simplest case of this kind is where one of the two parts is in need of supple-
mentation and is completed by the other part, which is saturated: that is to say,
it is not in need of supplementation. The former part corresponds to a concept,
the latter to an object (Frege 1915/1979b, p. 254)
The problem is that neither a function nor its argument are—in general—components of
the value of the function for that argument. To take one example from (Frege 1915/1979b),
there is a function that takes states to their capitals. This function takes Sweden to
Stockholm, but neither the function nor the country Sweden are components of the city
Stockholm.
Insofar as Frege endorses the part-whole metaphor, it is tempting to say that he must
also reject functional composition of sense.
Where our intuitions invite us to think in terms of parts combined in whole
they thereby resist the functional model, since it would in general be absurd to
suppose that the value of a function for some argument is a whole in which the
argument and function are combined. (Sullivan 1992, 91-2, cf. Klement 2002,
p. 67)
While there is nothing incoherent about a function or argument being a constituent of
its value for that argument,25 these cases would seem to be exceptional. So those who
interpret Fregean senses as functionally composing must provide some story about Frege’s
use of the language of parts and wholes to describe them.
25Levine (2002) offers a reading according to which Frege accepts both the functional composition of
reference and part-whole composition. There is an additional worry arising from the fact that it is now
customary to model functions as sets, and sets are treated as well-founded. In standard treatments, a function
cannot be a constituent of its value without violating the well-foundedness of set theory. Frege does not
identify his correlates of sets, value-ranges, as sets. Even if he were to model functions using value-ranges,
Frege’s own theory of value-ranges is (infamously) non-well-founded.
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Geach (1976, pp. 444-5) suggested that this part-whole language is misleading. Frege
himself sometimes wrote of the referent of an expression as composed of the referents of
its components, but later came to view this language as untenable because the referent of
‘the capital of Sweden’ does not contain the referent of ‘Sweden’ as a part. Geach would
suggest similarly discounting Frege’s part-whole language at the level of sense.
Sullivan has rightly pointed out that Frege is willing to retain part-whole language at
the level of sense even while disavowing it at the level of reference.
Frege constantly reiterates the part-whole model of thoughts . . . even in the
same breath as he denies its appropriateness for the complexity of reference[.]
So Geach’s proposal that we adopt a function-argument model of the complex-
ity of sense, must be assessed as emendation rather than as exegesis. (Sullivan
1992, p. 101; cf. Klement 2002, p. 69)
According to Sullivan, Frege abandons the use of part-whole language at the level of
reference because he recognizes that it is misleading. An argument of a function doesn’t
usually stand in anything like the relation of parthood to the value of the function for that
argument. But Frege continues to describe the relationship between the sense of a sentence
and the senses of its constituents in terms of the part-whole relation. This suggests—at
very least—that Frege’s reasons for regarding the part-whole relation as misleading at the
level of reference do not extend to the level of sense.
However, Frege himself also warns about part-whole language as applied to thoughts.
Frege says that this language “may lead to our looking at it the wrong way”, largely because
of the incompleteness of the senses of the functional expressions (Frege 1918-9/1984a, p.
386). He also calls this part-whole language figurative and analogical.
[W]e really talk figuratively when we transfer the relation of whole and part
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to thoughts; yet the analogy is so ready to hand and so generally appropriate
that we are hardly even bothered by the hitches which occur from time to time.
(Frege 1923-26/1984, p. 390)
While Frege’s use of part-whole language is suggestive, it strikes me as hardly decisive.
The important question is whether proponents of functional composition can explain the
appropriateness, if not the literal truth, of part-whole language in describing senses.
6.1 The Legitimacy of the Part-Whole Metaphor
If Frege’s part-whole language as applied to senses is metaphorical, why is this metaphor
apt in the case of senses but not in the case of referents? One of Frege’s most explicit
statements distinguishing the use of part-whole language at the levels of sense and ref-
erence occurs in “Notes for Ludwig Darmstaedter”. This passage is frequently cited to
criticize the functional composition of sense.26 I will briefly examine what Frege says
in this passage in order to argue that it is consistent with the functional composition of
sense. I then examine whether the passage creates an explanatory burden that functional
composition cannot meet.
In the passage, Frege says that the part-whole structure of a thought “maps” the
part-whole structure of a sentence that expresses it.
[C]orresponding to the part-whole relation of a thought and its parts we have,
by and large, the same relation for the sentence to its parts. (Frege 1915/1979b,
p. 255)
The part-whole metaphor suggests that there is a close correspondence between the syn-
tactic derivation of a sentence and the thought it expresses. For each expression occurring
26Dummett (1981b, pp. 262-3), Klement (2002, p. 69), and Heck and May (2011, p. 128). (Sullivan 1992, p.
101) cites also (Frege to Russell 20.10.1902, Frege 1980, p. 149) and (Frege 1979, pp. 191-2 and 225) to support
his reading given above.
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in a sentence, a corresponding sense occurs in the thought it expresses. Sentences that
differ in structure or in corresponding constituents express senses that differ in their parts.
This contrasts with the case of reference. For example, although the sense of ‘the capital
of Sweden’ will contain the sense of ‘Sweden’ as a part, its referent does not contain the
referent of ‘Sweden’ as a part: “We cannot say that Sweden is part of the capital of Sweden”
(1915/1979b, p. 255). In the remainder of this section, I spell out what I take to be this
passage’s face-value commitments about the individuation of senses, showing that the
functional composition of sense is compatible with these face-value commitments. In the
next section, I examine the charge that Frege’s account of sense composition must explain
these face-value commitments and that an account based on the functional composition
of sense cannot offer such an explanation.
One face-value commitment of the mapping metaphor is that two sentences in the
language of Begriffscchrift cannot express (and therefore map) the same thought without
having the same structure.
same structure: If ~αS = ~βS and α results from syntactic operation O on expres-
sions α1,. . . ,αn, then β results from syntactic operation O on expressions β1,. . . ,βn
and each of the αi and βi are of the same syntactic type.
By way of contrast, expressions of different structures can have the same referent.
Another commitment is that substituting expressions with different senses guarantees
to result in composite expressions with different senses.
If in a sentence or part of a sentence one constituent is replaced by another with
a different [referent], the different sentence or part that results does not have to
have a different [referent] from the original; on the other hand, it always has a
different sense. (Frege 1915/1979b, p. 255)
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The idea here is that if two sentences with the same structure differ only by the substitu-
tion of constituent expressions with different senses, then the sentences themselves have
different senses. Taken at face value, Frege seems committed to the view that sentences
‘Austin is hot’ and ‘the capital of Texas is hot’ will have different senses if ‘Austin’ and
‘the capital of Texas’ have different senses. Similarly, ‘Sam is a cordate’ and ‘Sam is a re-
nate’ will express different thoughts if ‘cordate’ and ‘renate’ have different senses (Quine
1970/1986, pp. 8-10). More generally, if two expressions with the same sense each result
from the application of a function term to n-arguments, then the function terms and all of
the arguments agree in sense.
same corresponding constituents: If α results from applying n-ary functional ex-
pression πα to n-argument expressions, α1,. . . ,αn and β results from applying n-ary
functional expression πβ to n-argument expressions, β1,. . . ,βn and ~αS = ~βS, then
~παS = ~πβS and ~αiS = ~βiS, for each i.27
Same corresponding constituents is equivalent to saying that the result of substituting
one constituent for another with different sense always results in an expression with a
different sense.28
Together same structure and same corresponding constituents impose strong con-
straints on the relationship between the sense of a composite expressions and the senses
of its constituents. Two composite expressions express the same sense only if they have
the same structure and their corresponding constituents have the same sense. This re-
quirement is a natural interpretation of the claim that a sentence maps the thought it
expresses.
27Compare the notion of inverse compositionality in (Pagin 2003, 295).
28Frege’s criterion of sense identity would therefore very closely match Carnap’s (1947/1988, p. 59, 14-
1(b)) notion of intensional isomorphism or Church’s Alternative (0), as is suggested by (Dummett 1981a, pp.
227-8, 379). Klement (2002, pp.102-5) discusses the issue extensively and argues that Frege should endorse a
principle that is slighlty weaker than same corresponding constituents.
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However, there is no conflict between this observation and the functional composi-
tion of sense. If Frege is simply making the point that sentences with different syntactic
structures or sentences whose corresponding constituents differ in sense have different
senses, then the proponent of functional composition can readily agree. Effectively, this
is just a strengthening of the point that expressions with the same referent may differ in
sense. Indeed, one of the most prominent developments of the functional composition
of sense, Church’s Alternative (0), nearly approximates these constraints on semantic val-
ues (Church 1951). Pagin (2003) offers a similar argument that most of what is wanted out
of the part-whole metaphor can be extracted by requiring principles analogous to same
structure and same corresponding constituents.
6.2 Explanation
Some proponents of structured senses would argue that while the functional composition
of sense is compatible with these strong constraints, it does not explain them. These
constraints are immediately predicted by the structured view.29 According to Heck and
May (2011, pp. 144-5; cf. Dummett 1981a, p. 152): “. . . [We] can earn a right to [same
corresponding constituents] if we regard compositions of senses in a more structural
light.”
Why exactly does the structural conception of senses entail same structure and same
corresponding constituents? Recall, that this is the view that there is a composition
operation which I denoted as ‘. . . 〈. . .〉’ so that:
sense composition: If α is an n-adic functional expression and β1, . . . , βn are n ex-
29Klement (2002, p. 77) and Anderson (1980: pp. 223-4) say that Frege only endorses a more limited
principle. This more limited principle says that sentences differing by the substitution of saturated names
with different senses always have different senses, but the same does not hold for sentences that differ by the
substitution of unsaturated senses. I am doubtful that this more limited principle can motivate the part-whole
conception of semantic composition since it is no longer clear that the sense of a function term is a component
of the sense of a sentence that contains it.
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pressions of the right type, then ~α(β1, . . . , βn)S = ~αS〈~β1S, . . . , ~βnS)〉.
Assume that this composition operation is injective. That is: if f 〈a1 . . . , an〉 = g〈b1 . . . , bn〉,
then f = g and ai = bi, for each i. If being injective is built into the very concept of the
relevant composition operation, then the conception of senses as structured explains same
corresponding constituents. Of course, not all composition operations are injective.
Summation, for instance, is not since one object may be the sum of its top half and bottom
half or of its left half and right half. Nonetheless, if we assume that the composition
operation is what unites entities into a structured whole, then there is reason to accept this
reversibility principle.30
If Frege is indeed committed to same structureand samecorrespondingconstituents,
then there is some pressure on him to accept that senses are structured. To repeat, the
advantage is that this conception explains these two theses. They do not come out true by
accident. But it is worth investigating the depth of Frege’s commitment to these principles.
In the next two subsections, I will suggest that neither same structure nor same corre-
sponding constituents should fall immediately out of Frege’s view of sense composition.
In particular, both principles raise tension with Frege’s other commitments.
6.3 Against Same Structure
Frege’s commitment to same structure does not seem very deep. Even in the passage
of “Notes for Ludwig Darmstaedter” which motivates same structure and same corre-
sponding constituents, Frege says that the sentence only “by and large” maps its sense.
That is, it is only “by and large” true that the parts of the sentence correspond to the parts
of the sense. But if semantic composition is governed by a principle such as structured
30The alternative is to view the composition relation as somehow “plastic” in the sense of (MacBride 2003,
p. 127). Cf. (Bronzo 2017).
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senses, and the composition relation is injective, then it is hard to see how there could ever
be exceptions. I believe that this concession reflects the fact that Frege commits to many
instances of sentences with different structures expressing the same sense.
As is well known, Frege repeatedly suggests exceptions to same structure. These ex-
ceptions include three kinds of case. Sometimes, Frege finds cases where two natural lan-
guage sentences with different structure express the same sense. Elsewhere, Frege argues
that a natural language sentence and its differently structured Begriffsschrift regimentation
express the same thought. Most importantly, Frege offers cases where the structure of two
sentences of Begriffsschrift express the same thought. Consider, for instance, the following
commitments:
• ‘Sea-water is salt’ and ‘it is true that sea-water is salt’ have the same sense.31





’ have the same sense.32
• ‘A’ and ‘A and A’ have the same sense. In Begriffsschrift notation: ‘A’ and ‘ A
A
’
have the same sense.33
• ‘A’ and ‘it is not the case that it is not the case that A’ have the same sense. In
Begriffsschrift notation: ‘A’ and ‘ A’ have the same sense.34
• ‘for any x, f (x) = g(x)’ and ‘the value range of f (ξ) = the value range of g(ξ)’ have
31This example is from (Frege 1915/1979a, 251). cf (Frege 1892/1970, p. 64) and (Frege 1918-9/1984b, p. 354).
32(Frege 1923-26/1984, p. 393).
33(Frege 1923-26/1984, p. 393, footnote 21).
34(Frege 1923-26/1984, p. 399).
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the same sense. In Begriffsschrift notation: ‘ a f (a) = g(a)’ and ‘έ f (ε) = άg(α)’ have
the same sense.35
Treating sense as functionally compositional allows for these failures of same structure.
On the other hand, many versions of the view that senses are structured have difficulty
making sense of these passages. They often cite these very examples as a “slip” on Frege’s
part.36 Insofar as they have to reject Frege’s explicit pronouncements (which are often
important components of his logicism), this seems to be again a cost of the view. But even
if we take Frege as merely oscillating in his opinion about same structure, it seems unfair
to think that the principle is a direct consequence of his conception of sense composition.
It would be as though he is repeatedly forgetting his view of sense composition. A
more reasonable interpretation is that Frege is simply undecided about precisely how fine
grained senses are.
6.4 Against Same Corresponding Constituents
same corresponding constituents says that if α and β differ only by the substitution of
one constituent for another with different sense, then α and βdiffer in sense. We should not
accept this principle because it conflicts with Frege’s syntactic commitments as developed
in Basic Laws §30. Although (Hodes 1982) and (Klement 2002 pp. 85-6, 147-8) have
offered a similar argument, they focus on different ways of breaking up a single name into
a functional expression and its arguments. I look instead at different ways in which Frege
thinks we may syntactically derive a single name. My aim is also more limited in that I
am trying to show only that the argument for structured senses offered by Heck and May
fails.
35(Frege 1891/1997, p. 136)
36A major source of this interpretation is (Dummett 1991, chapter 14).
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Names (which include function names and sentences) of the language of Begriffsschrift
are derived using two formation rules.
Rule 1: If π(ξ1, . . . , ξn) is an n-ary function name and γ1, . . . , γn are n well formed
names of appropriate type, then π(γ1, . . . , γn) is a well formed name.
Rule 2: If φ is a complete name containing occurrences of γ, then the result of
replacing γ in φ by a mark of incompleteness ξ is a function name.
Rule 1 allows one to form a name by saturating the argument places of a function name
by arguments of the appropriate type. Rule 2 allows one to form a function name by
removing a component of a saturated name.
One consequence of Rule 2 is that the same name may be derived in multiple ways.
For instance, there are multiple syntactic derivations of the self-identity claim γ = γ. The
language of Begriffsschrift has a primitive dyadic relation term ξ = ζ. One may sequentially
saturate the argument places of this relation term with γ to yield ξ = γ and then γ = γ.
However, the function name ξ = ξ can also be syntactically derived using Rule 2 by
saturating both positions of ξ = ζ with a name and then removing it. We can then fill the
argument position of ξ = ξ with γ to yield γ = γ. So the name γ = γ results (A) from the
application of ξ = γ to γ and also (B) from the application of ξ = ξ to γ. The semantic
rules assign the same reference and (presumably) the same sense to γ = γ under either
derivation.37
37Klement (2002, p. 46) reconstructs Frege’s syntax using a restricted version of Rule 1 which only permits
(atomic) Roman letter function names. He also introduces a separate rule for quantified formulae which does
not require Rule 2. As reconstruction, this is obviously fine. But as an exegesis of Frege’s own syntax, it is
strictly inaccurate, since Frege derives a a = a from a combination of both rules. This means that the derived
function name ξ = ξ can be fed into the quantifier a φ(a) using the first rule. Frege introduces the rule
allowing one to fill the arguments of a first-level function name with a saturated name and the rule allowing
one to fill the argument of a second-level function name with a first-level function name in the same sentence.
So, just as he explicitly allows a non-Roman function name to fill the quantifier, we should also interpret him
as allowing a name to fill a non-Roman function name. Elsewhere, Klement (2010, p. 177) is clear about the
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But this creates a problem with same corresponding constituents. We obviously
have that γ = γ has the same sense as itself. But we also have that it is formed from the
application of ξ = γ to γ and also from the application of ξ = ξ to γ. But ξ = γ and
ξ = ξ differ in reference and—therefore—in sense. This result is inconsistent with same
corresponding constituents. So Frege can accept same corresponding constituents,
only by rejecting his explicit syntax.
One might attempt to save same corresponding constituents by appealing to the
distinction in (Dummett 1981b) between analysis and decomposition. A simple way
to develop this approach—as for instance in (Sullivan 2010)—would have it that γ = γ
contains the constituents that show up in a privileged syntactic derivation, say (A), but not
(B). So the advocate of structured senses can say that the sense of ξ = ξ is not a constituent
of the sense of γ = γ. But given that the function name γ = γ results from the application of
ξ = ξ to γ, we still need a semantic composition principle that does not require the sentence
that results of syntactically combining a function name with an argument name to express
a thought which contains the senses of the function and argument name as constituents.
The functional composition of sense can deliver this. Dummett’s own approach is more
radical: incomplete expressions such as ‘ξ = ξ’ do not occur in the syntactic derivation of
γ = γ. Rather, γ = γ is formed by combining two instances of γ with the simple predicate
‘=’. Because Dummett (1981a, p. 30) acknowledges that Frege “tacitly assimilated simple
predicates to complex ones”, it is reasonable to question whether this accurately presents
Frege’s own syntax. Indeed, the approach seems to conflict with the syntax explicitly
offered in Basic Laws §30. A full accounting of Dummett’s proposal as a positive position
Fregean syntax. Landini (1996) also thinks that Fregean senses have unique analysis into parts extractable
from their syntactic presentation. This might suggest that names of Begriffsschrift in Landini’s account have a
unique syntactic derivation. However, Landini’s account leans heavily on a notion of “mutual satisfaction”
(p. 131), which I do not find in Frege.
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is called for, but is beyond the scope of this paper.38
Klement (2002, pp. 85-6, 147-8) offers a similar argument to the conclusion that the
thesis that I am calling same corresponding constituentsmust be weakened. According
to Klement, replacing a saturated name by another with a different sense must result in a
new expression with a different sense. But the same cannot hold of functional expressions.
In making this claim, Klement weakens the case that the passage in “Notes for Ludwig
Darmstaedter” supports structured conceptions of sense rather than the functional com-
position of sense. Even a proponent of structured senses such as Klement must offer a
restricted reading of the passage. Klement must either reject the view that the sense of
a composite is the structured whole containing the senses of its immediate constituents
or he must allow that a single sense may have multiple structures. Either concession,
in my view, undermines the motivation offered by Heck and May for abandoning the
functional composition of sense.
7 Conclusion
The functional compositionof sense is entailed by two central Fregean commitments: the
functional composition of reference and the reference shift semantics. Whether Frege
spotted the entailment or not, it is immediate. Opponents of the functional composition
of sense wind up rejecting not only the letter, but also the spirit, of the two underlying
Fregean commitments. Moreover, we have seen that the strongest arguments against
taking sense to be functionally compositional—Frege’s use of part-whole language and
his flirtation with same structure and same corresponding constituents—are hardly
decisive considerations. Indeed, core arguments in Frege’s development of his logicism go
unexplained, if we take same structure and same corresponding constituents to simply
38(Sullivan 2010) is a nice discussion.
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fall out of his view of sense composition. Together these theses amount to the claim that
the sense of a composite expression encodes the senses of the component expressions and
their arrangement. Frege’s vacillation regarding same structure and same corresponding
constituents is completely explained, on the other hand, if he endorses the functional
composition of sense.
The core arguments of this paper have repercussions for other debates in Frege exegesis.
One salient application arises because Frege applies his reference shift semantics not
only to expressions embedded in belief ascriptions, but also to expressions embedded in
quotation.
If words are used in the ordinary way, what one intends to speak of is their
reference. It can also happen, however, that one wishes to talk about the
words themselves or their sense. This happens, for instance, when the words
of another are quoted. One’s own words then first designate the words of
the other speaker, and only the latter have their usual reference. In writing,
the words are in this case enclosed in quotation marks. Accordingly, a word
standing between quotation marks must not be taken as having its ordinary
reference. (Frege 1892/1970, 58-9)
In a quotation context, an expression denotes itself. This means that when the sentence
‘Austin is hot’ is embedded under quotation, it denotes itself, the word ‘Austin’ refers
to itself, and the predicate ‘ξ is hot’ refers to itself. Because a sentence is a composite
expression, its referent must be the result of applying the function referred to by ‘ξ is hot’
to the argument referred to by ‘Austin’. But since ‘ξ is hot’ refers to itself in a quotation
context, it must be a function from a name to a sentence. The result is another controversial
thesis in Frege exegesis known as the Functional Conception of Sentential Complexity.39
39The thesis is defended explicitly in (Geach 1976) and (Sullivan 1992) and criticized in (Oliver 2010).
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While this paper does not examine the Functional Conception of Sentential Complexity in
the detail it deserves, similar issues arise regarding Frege’s use of part-whole terminology
and inverse compositionality.40 Indeed, there are passages where Frege seems to explicitly
endorse the view that the predicates are objects and not functions.41 Yet the commitment to
the functional compositionof reference and thereference shift semantics, as applied to
quotation, seem to entail the functional conception of sentential complexity. It is possible,
again, that Frege himself was undecided or didn’t draw the connection. But the entailment
is straightforward.
Another point that will need further examination is Frege’s notion of understanding
or grasp.42 In a famous passage, Frege appeals to the part-whole metaphor to explain
how language users can understand infinitely many novel thoughts on the basis of finite
understanding.
It is astonishing what language can do. With a few syllables it can express an
incalculable number of thoughts, so that even if a thought has been grasped by
an inhabitant of the Earth for the very first time, a form of words can be found
in which it will be understood by someone else to whom it is entirely new.
This would not be possible, if we could not distinguish parts in the thought
corresponding to parts of a sentence, so that the picture of the sentence can
serve as a picture of the structure of the thought. (Frege 1923-26/1984, p. 390)
At first glance, this passage—and its near duplicate (Frege 1979, 225)—strongly supports
a literal part-whole reading. Yet, it is immediately following this passage—and in the
40In particular, we might ask whether the result of combining a monadic first-level functional expression α
with a saturated expression βmay also be the result of applying a distinct functional expression γ to a distinct
argument expression δ.
41For instance, (Frege to Russell 29.06.1902, Frege 1980, pp. 135-6). Thanks to an anonymous referee for
pointing me to the passage.
42Thanks to an anonymous referee for suggesting the need to explicitly address this passage.
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same paragraph—that Frege (1923-26/1984, p. 390) says we that “talk figuratively” in
transferring the part-whole language to thoughts. This strongly suggest that Frege himself
does not think that the metaphor needs to be taken literally to account for the ability of
speakers to express or understand novel thoughts. Perhaps our ability to express and
grasp novel thoughts can be fully accounted for by principles such as same structure
and same corresponding constituents. However, this paper has made no attempt to
work out a robust theory of understanding or grasping a thought, either based on internal
considerations of Frege’s text or on independent considerations. Further work is required
to see whether a reasonable conception of understanding or grasping a thought is fully
compatible with the functional composition of sense.43
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